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ABSTRACT 
 
Casner (2006) tested the ability of a prosopagnosic, LB, to discriminate 
objects that would require the use of the coordinate relations recognition system 
posited by Cooper and Wojan.  Casner reported that the prosopagnosic, LB, was 
impaired in coordinate relations tasks, but did not differ significantly from controls 
in all tasks that only required categorical recognition.  However, Farah, Levinson, 
and Klein (1995) reported on a patient who was not impaired at discriminating 
eyeglasses, a task for which the coordinate relations hypothesis would predict an 
impairment.   The present study replicated Farah et al.’s paradigm with the 
prosopagnosic, LB.  One experiment found that LB, relative to controls, was 
significantly impaired when discriminating eyeglasses requiring the use of a 
coordinate relations recognition system rather than a categorical recognition 
system, however, the other experiment failed to find such a difference. Two 
experiments results may have arisen from a strategy that LB developed used. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A number of empirical results suggest that the process of recognizing 
faces is different from the process of basic-level object recognition. “Basic-level” 
refers to the categorization level at which people tend to classify a presented 
object (Rosch & Mervis, 1981).  For example, humans have greater difficulty 
recognizing faces that are inverted than faces that are upright, but no such effect 
is shown for basic level object recognition; this phenomenon is known as the face 
inversion effect (Valentine, 1989; Yin, 1969).  Additionally, humans have greater 
difficulty recognizing photographic negatives of faces than normal photographs of 
faces, however, researchers fail to find a significant difference between the 
recognition of photographic negatives and normal photographs of basic-level 
objects (Galper, 1970; Galper & Hochberg, 1971).  Furthermore, researchers 
have found that infants will track faces longer than basic-level objects (Maurer & 
Barrera, 1981).   
In addition to behavioral studies, several results from cognitive 
neuroscience suggest that the human brain processes faces and objects 
differently. First, a double dissociation has been shown between basic-level 
object recognition and face recognition.  Specifically, some neurological patients 
(known as prosopagnosics) are impaired in their ability to recognize human 
faces, but retain the ability to recognize basic-level objects (Farah, 2004).  In 
contrast, researchers have noted a few neurological patients (known as object 
agnosics) who are impaired in their ability to recognize basic-level objects, but 
retain their ability to recognize human faces (Humphreys & Rumiati, 1998; 
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Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997; Rumiati, Humphreys, Riddoch, & 
Bateman, 1994).   
Second, neuroimaging studies have found a region in the right inferior-
temporal lobe, known as the Fusiform Face Area (FFA), that appears to respond 
selectively to faces (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; for reviews see 
Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006; McCarthy, Puce, Gore, & Allison 1997; Sergent, Ohta, 
& MacDonald, 1992).  Additionally, researchers using single-cell recordings on 
monkeys reported of cells in the temporal lobe that fire exclusively to faces 
(Tsao, Freiwald, Tootell, & Livingstone, 2006).  Third, face recognition shows a 
strong right-cerebral hemisphere advantage (for a review see Ellis, 1983), 
however, researchers failed to find a hemispheric advantage for basic-level 
object recognition (Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Young, Bion, & Ellis, 1980). The 
results from the aforementioned research suggest that object recognition and 
face recognition are subserved by (at least) two neurologically distinct recognition 
systems. 
What sorts of tasks are mediated by the face recognition system? 
 There are a number of empirical results that suggest that the face 
recognition system is used for recognizing other sorts of objects as well.  For 
example, prosopagnosics often have difficulty discriminating different four legged 
animals, currencies, plants, and buildings sharing the same general features 
(Farah, 2004; Mayer, 2007).  A number of researchers have developed theories 
to explain the other sorts of tasks that the face recognition system might 
subserve. 
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 The biological recognition hypothesis posits that the face recognition 
system mediates recognition of all biological stimuli, and that the basic-level 
object recognition system mediates the recognition of non-biological stimuli 
(Cappa et al., 1998; Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999). 
Support for this theory is provided by the fact that prosopagnosics often lack the 
ability to recognize different animals.  For example, one prosopagnosic who was 
a farmer could no longer distinguish the faces of his cows after his brain was 
damaged (Bornstein, Stroka, & Munitz, 1969). Further, neuroimaging studies 
have found brain regions in the lateral fusiform gyrus that respond selectively to 
biological stimuli (e.g., animals), while brain regions in the medial fusiform gyrus 
respond selectively to non-biological stimuli such as houses and tools (Chao et 
al., 1999).  A major problem with this hypothesis is that prosopagnosics are not 
equally impaired in all animal discrimination tasks.  For example, Damasio et al. 
(1982) tested the ability of two prosopagnosics to discriminate different animals 
and noted that the prosopagnosics could always discriminate biological stimuli 
such as “owl,” “elephant,” and “horse” from one another.  Damasio et al.’s (1982) 
patients also reported impairments in recognition of non-biological stimuli such as 
discriminating different cars and selecting the correct container from a shelf.  
 The subordinate-level recognition hypothesis posits that the face 
recognition system mediates subordinate-level recognition and that the basic-
level recognition system mediates basic-level recognition (Damasio, 1982; 
Damasio, & Van Hoesen, 1982; Gauthier et al., 1997; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, 
& Anderson, 2000).  Subordinate-level tasks are tasks that require distinguishing 
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between two members of the same basic-level category (e.g., distinguishing a 
Dell laptop computer from an Apple laptop computer).  Support for this 
hypothesis is provided by Damasio et al. (1982) who noted that some 
prosopagnosics were unable to distinguish different cars or different containers 
from one another.  Additionally, neuroimaging studies have reported greater 
activation in the fusiform face area when subjects perform subordinate-level 
recognition tasks than when subjects perform basic-level recognition tasks 
(Gauthier et al., 1997).  A problem with the subordinate-level recognition 
hypothesis is that prosopagnosics are often impaired at basic-level recognition 
tasks.  For example, prosopagnosics often have difficulty recognizing different 
types of four legged animals that do not belong to the same subordinate class 
(Mayer, 2007). 
 The expert recognition hypothesis posits that the face recognition system 
is used for any task at which the individual is an expert (Diamond & Carey, 1986; 
Gauthier et al., 2000; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997).  This hypothesis presumes that all 
humans are experts at face recognition and that the same brain regions that are 
used for face recognition will be used for any perceptual task at which a 
particular human has become an expert.  Diamond and Carey (1986) found that, 
similar to the face inversion effect, dog experts’ memory for photographs of dogs 
was disrupted by inversion, an effect not demonstrated by non-experts.  Some of 
the most convincing data suggesting that the face recognition system mediates 
expert recognition is provided by Gauthier’s  “Greeble” studies (Gauthier & Tarr, 
1997; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000). In these studies 
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participants are trained to discriminate a set of novel homogeneous stimuli (see 
Figure 1) until they reach a certain level of expertise.  These studies have 
demonstrated that Greeble experts show greater activation in the FFA than do 
novices when identifying Greebles and are less accurate at discriminating 
inverted Greebles than upright Greebles.  
 
Figure 1.  Examples of the novel homogeneous stimuli used in Gauthier’s Greeble 
experiments.  Participants were trained on these stimuli until they could accurately 
discriminate the different Greebles from one another.  Greeble experts showed greater 
activation in their fusiform face are than non-Greeble experts when they viewed 
Greebles.  
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The coordinate relations hypothesis 
 Some theorists have proposed that the human visual system performs 
basic-level object recognition using a representation that codes an object’s parts 
and the categorical relations between the parts. Such a representation is called a 
structural description (Biederman, 1987). In theories positing a structural 
description, the relations among the parts of an object are coded using broad 
categories rather than specific values.  For example, Hummel and Biederman 
(1992) proposed that the relations among an object’s parts are defined by their 
relative position (above, below, and side of), size (larger than, smaller than, and 
equal to) and orientation to one another (parallel to, perpendicular to, and oblique 
to).  For example, according to Hummel and Biederman (1992) the coffee mugs 
shown in Figure 2 would be coded as a cylinder with a curved cylinder to the 
side.  
 
Figure 2.  Two different coffee mugs that share the same structural description (a 
cylinder with a curved-cylinder to the side). 
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 The computational advantages of using a structural description to perform 
object recognition include that it allows for rapid recognition of most objects 
despite partial occlusion, changes in size, changes in orientation, and rotations in 
depth that preserve the object’s structural description.  However, a problem 
arises for structural description theories when an individual has to differentiate 
two objects that share the same structural description (such as differentiating the 
mugs shown in Figure 2).  Structural description theories cannot account for the 
human capacity to distinguish between objects that share the same structural 
description. 
To deal with the limitations of structural descriptions, some theorists have 
posited representations that use coordinate relations (Bülthoff & Edelman, 1992; 
Siebert & Waxman, 1992; Ullman, 1989; Ullman & Basri, 1991). Coordinate 
relations representations code the precise distances of each object primitive (i.e., 
part) from a fixed reference point or set of fixed reference points.  For example, 
Figure 3 illustrates how a categorical representation (i.e., a structural description) 
and coordinate relations representation would code the position of my right eye 
(from the viewers perspective).  A categorical relations representation would 
code my right eye as being, “to the side of left eye, above and to the side of the 
nose, and above and to the side of the mouth.”  In contrast, a coordinate 
relations representation would code my right eye as being 4 units below and 2.66 
units to the right of the specified reference point.  
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The coordinate relations hypothesis proposes that most basic-level object 
recognition tasks use a representation of shape that codes the relationships 
among the parts categorically.  In contrast, the face recognition system 
represents shape using coordinate relations (Cooper & Wojan, 2000).  According 
to the coordinate relations hypothesis, the face recognition system is used to 
discriminate objects sharing the same structural description (Brooks & Cooper, 
2004; Cooper & Wojan, 2000).   
There are a number of empirical results that support the coordinate 
relations hypothesis.  The recognition deficits prosopagnosics show with objects 
other than faces all tend to be on tasks that require the discrimination of objects 
Figure 3.  Illustration of how categorical (left picture) and coordinate relations (right picture) 
would code the position of the left eye of a face.  Categorical relations would code the left eye 
as side of the right eye, above and side of the nose, and above and side of the mouth.  In 
contrast, coordinate relations would code the left eye as 4 units below and 2.66 units to the right 
of the given reference point. 
 
                                                                                                        
  
 
9
that share the same structural description (e.g., four-legged animals, buildings, 
foods, cars).  Further, Cooper and Wojan (2000) found that disruptions to the 
categorical relations among the parts of an object are more disruptive to basic-
level object recognition than disruptions in the coordinate relations, while the 
opposite pattern of results is found for face recognition.  
Prosopagnosia: regions of damage, causes, and co-occurring deficits  
The purpose of the research being proposed here is to provide a test of 
the co-ordinate relations hypothesis using a prosopagnosic.  Prosopagnosia 
often results from bilateral temporo-occipital damage (Damasio, Damasio, & Van 
Hoesen, 1982) although prosopagnosia can also result from unilateral damage to 
the right hemisphere (De Renzi, 1986; De Renzi, 1994; Wada & Yamamota, 
2001).  The most common areas damaged in prosopagnosic patients are the 
lingual gyrus, parahippocampal gyrus, and the fusiform gyrus (see Figure 4 for 
an illustration). 
 
 Figure 4.  An illustration of the most common areas damaged in prosopagnosic 
patients (specifically, the parahippocampal gyrus, lingual gyrus, and fusiform gyrus; 
taken from Casner, 2006). 
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Prosopagnosia usually results from head trauma (as a result of an 
accident) or a stroke.  Of all the types of strokes associated with prosopagnosia, 
a posterior cerebral artery infarct is the most common type (Mayer, 2007; Brand 
et al., 2000).  A review of all posterior cerebral artery infarcts suggests that 
prosopagnosia is very rare.  Kumral, Bayulkem, Ataç, and Alper (2004) reviewed 
the clinical features of more than 140 patients who suffered posterior cerebral 
artery infarcts and noted only six who had prosopagnosia.  As noted in Mayer’s 
review, prosopagnosia often co-occurs with other perceptual deficits, namely, 
anomia (inability to name objects), hemianopia (loss of one half of the visual 
field), achromatopsia (colorblindness), and topographic disorientation (inability to 
navigate through the environment). 
Evidence from prosopagnosics supporting the coordinate relations hypothesis 
A number of other studies suggest a link between prosopagnosia and an 
inability to perform tasks requiring coordinate relations.  Barton et al. (2004) 
tested seven prosopagnosics on an array of perceptual tasks in hopes of 
identifying a perceptual processing impairment contributing to prosopagnosia.  
Barton et al. concluded that deficits in the perception of luminance, spatial 
resolution, curvature, line orientation, and contrast sensitivity were unlikely to 
contribute to prosopagnosia.  Interestingly, and consistent with the coordinate 
relations hypothesis, almost all of the patients were impaired in fruit and 
vegetable identification tasks and tasks requiring patients to code the distances 
of four dots from one another.  
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Casner (2006) tested a prosopagnosic (LB) on three experiments that 
required LB to discriminate two objects that either shared or did not share the 
same structural description.  The first experiment required LB and controls to 
indicate whether two animals were the same species or different species.  Half of 
the different species trials consisted of animals that shared the same structural 
description (e.g., a fox and a wolf). The remaining different trials consisted of 
animals that did not share the same structural description (e.g., a fox and a 
goose).   Consistent with the coordinate relations hypothesis, but in contrast to 
the biological hypothesis, LB produced significantly more errors, compared to 
controls, in trials requiring her to discriminate species that shared the same 
structural description, but did not reliably differ from controls when discriminating 
species that did not share the same structural description.  
The second experiment required LB and controls to indicate whether two 
objects within the same subordinate-level category were physically identical.  In 
half of the different trials, the two objects differed in the length of one of the 
object’s parts (e.g., a rectangular table compared to a longer rectangular table), 
while maintaining the same structural description.  In the remaining different 
trials, the two objects differed in their structural descriptions (e.g., a round table 
compared to a square table).  Consistent with the coordinate relations 
hypothesis, but in contrast to the subordinate-level recognition hypothesis, LB 
made significantly more errors than controls when differentiating subordinate-
level objects that shared the same structural description, but did not differ from 
controls when discriminating subordinate-level objects that did not share the 
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same structural description. 
The third experiment required LB and controls to indicate whether two 
nonsense objects were physically identical when they had the same parts but 
sometimes differed in the relations among the parts.  Consistent with the 
coordinate relations hypothesis, but in contrast to the expert recognition 
hypothesis, LB made significantly more errors than controls when discriminating 
nonsense objects that shared the same structural description, but did not differ 
from controls when discriminating nonsense objects that did not share the same 
structural description. 
Evidence from prosopagnosics that appears contrary to the coordinate relations 
hypothesis 
 The coordinate relations hypothesis predicts that all prosopagnosics, in 
addition to being impaired at face discrimination tasks, should show impairments 
in object recognition whenever the objects being discriminated share the same 
structural description.  However, there are a few reports in the literature where 
prosopagnosics appears to show no impairment on recognition tasks for which 
the coordinate relations hypothesis would predict an impairment (e.g., McNeil & 
Warrington, 1993; Farah, Levinson, & Klein, 1995). 
 McNeil and Warrington (1993) tested a prosopagnosic’s (WJ) ability to 
recognize sheep.  WJ was a sheep farmer at the time of testing and showed 
considerable difficulty naming human faces, however, WJ was as accurate as 
profession-matched controls in recognizing different sheep.  The results of this 
experiment appear to contradict the predictions made by the coordinate relations 
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hypothesis.  Specifically, the coordinate relations hypothesis predicts that WJ 
should show impairments in sheep identification because the sheep being 
compared would activate the same structural description.  If the sheep being 
compared had distinct markings (i.e., they differed in the surface features rather 
than shape), it would explain why WJ was able to distinguish the sheep even 
though they activate the same structural description.  In fact, McNeil and 
Warrington provided figures of the types of sheep WJ could and could not 
recognize, and it appears that WJ was able to recognize sheep with distinct 
markings, but showed difficulty recognizing sheep of a solid color (see Figure 5).  
Thus the results of McNeil and Warrington (1993) may not contradict the 
coordinate relations hypothesis. 
 
  
 In a similar study, Farah, Levinson, and Klein (1995) tested a 
prosopagnosic’s (LH) ability to discriminate among eyeglasses. Although LH was 
significantly impaired in face recognition, he did not differ from controls in the 
ability to discriminate among eyeglasses.  Assuming these results reflect the true 
Figure 5.  Examples of sheep that WJ could recognize (left photo) and examples of 
sheep that WJ could not recognize (right photo). 
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recognition abilities of LH (see Tarr & Gauthier, 2000 for methodological 
concerns), the results appear to contradict the predictions made by the 
coordinate relations hypothesis; because it would seem likely that many of the 
eyeglasses would share the same structural description.  Yet, it is not clear from 
the description of the stimuli in the article if the eyeglasses used in the study 
shared the same structural descriptions (e.g., all oval-shaped lens) or if they 
varied in their structural descriptions (e.g., some oval and some rectangular 
shaped).   
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CURRENT STUDY 
The purpose of the current set of experiments was to determine whether 
the results of Farah et al. (1995) would be replicated when controlling for the 
eyeglasses’ structural descriptions. Four experiments tested a prosopagnosic 
and controls on their ability to discriminate eyeglasses.   
Experiment 1 
The first experiment was a direct replication of the eyeglass experiment of 
Farah et al. (1995).  Just as in Farah et al., the eyeglasses in Experiment 1 were 
chosen without maintaining the same structural description across all eyeglasses 
that were used in this experiment.   
Method 
Participants  
 The participants consisted of a prosopagnosic, an age-matched control 
subject, and a group of undergraduate control subjects.  The patient, LB, served 
as the prosopagnosic in all four experiments. LB is 43 year-old retired junior high 
math teacher who suffered a posterior artery stroke, causing bilateral 
inferiortemporal damage and partial unilateral hippocampus damage.  LB has 
subsequently been diagnosed with prosopagnosia, achromatopsia, anomia, 
topographical disorientation, right upper quadrantanopia, and left homonymous 
hemianopia (Casner, 2006). 
 LB retains normal visual acuity in her remaining visual quadrant (lower 
right quadrant).  While LB elicits some memory impairments (e.g., memory for 
dates and names, and episodic memory impairments), her long-term memory, 
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procedural memory, and motor skills remain intact.  LB is not impaired in most 
forms of basic-level object identification, however, LB did report having difficulty 
recognizing some types of food, animals, buildings, and money which are all 
common co-occurring recognition deficits in prosopagnosics (Mayer 2007). 
 An aged-matched control (FD), reporting corrected-to-normal vision, 
participated in all four experiments.  FD is a 42-year-old male.  FD was recruited 
to determine if LB’s perceptual impairments were merely an artifact of age.     
  Sixteen undergraduate psychology students at Iowa State University who 
received course credit for their participation were used as controls.  All control 
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  The control 
participants consisted of four males and twelve females.  The mean age of the 
control participants was 21.47 (SD=1.66). 
Apparatus 
A 15-inch LCD display with a resolution of 1280 x 854 pixels powered by a 
Macintosh G4 desktop was used to present the stimuli and collect the data.  The 
experiment was presented using Superlab Pro software.  Responses were 
collected via two keys using a standard Macintosh keyboard that gives ± 0.5 ms 
response time accuracy.   
Forty black and white photographs of male faces were used as stimuli in 
the experiment.  Photographs of faces with facial hair and/or eyeglasses were 
not used nor were faces with long or strange hair.  Additionally, forty black and 
white photographs of eyeglasses, photographed from a standard perspective, 
were included.  No eyeglasses with visible logos or names were used.  Both 
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faces and eyeglasses were divided evenly into sets of “old” items, which 
appeared in the study and test phases of the experiment, and “new” items, which 
only appeared during the test phase of the experiment.  As in Farah et al. (1995), 
similar looking eyeglasses were divided evenly between “old” and “new” phases 
of the experiment.  
Procedure 
The procedures of Experiment 1 exactly followed that of Farah et al.’s 
(1995) eyeglass experiment.  Presentation of the stimuli during the study phase 
was self-paced.  In the study phase of the experiment, control participants were 
shown each photograph (20 faces and 20 eyeglasses) for three seconds, with 
faces and eyeglasses randomly intermixed.  Like Farah et al. (1995), the same 
procedure was used for the prosopagnosic patient except that the patient 
received more study time.  During the study phase, LB viewed all study 
photographs three times each for six seconds.   
Upon completion of the study phase, all participants completed a test 
phase in which they were instructed to make old/new judgments on a randomly 
assigned order of all the old and new photographs of faces and eyeglasses (40 
faces and 40 eyeglasses). Presentation of the stimuli during the test phase was 
self-paced. The participants were instructed to press the “z” key if they believed 
the photograph was presented during the study phase (an “old” item) and to 
press the “/” key if they believed the photograph was not presented in the study 
phase (a “new” item).  The order of presentation was identical for all participants 
in the experiment. 
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Results 
 A modified t-test procedure1 (for description see Crawford & Howell, 1998) 
was used to determine if LB’s accuracy for distinguishing “old” and “new” 
eyeglasses and faces differed reliably from the aged-matched control and 
student controls’ accuracy to distinguish “old” and “new” eyeglasses and faces.  
The modified t-test procedure is used when comparing a single subject to a small 
sample.  Due to LB’s restricted visual field (i.e., blindness in the left half and 
upper right quadrant of the visual field; Casner, 2006), LB’s reaction time on all 
experiments tended to be slower than the controls’ reaction times.  Although in all 
experiments reaction time will be reported, reaction time was not the principal 
dependent variable of interest in the current studies.  The purpose of reporting 
reaction time was to test whether any differences in accuracy found between LB 
and controls were the result of a speed-accuracy trade-off. 
 
Accuracy Data  
The accuracy data from Experiment 1 can be seen in Figure 6.  Analysis 
of the age-matched control’s accuracy to discriminate “old” and “new” faces 
compared to the controls’ accuracy to discriminate “old” and “new” faces 
revealed no significant difference, t(15)=.36, p>.05.  The standard error for face 
comparisons of accuracy, as described by Crawford and Howell (1998), was 
                                                
1  
USING NORMS WHEN N IS SMALL 483
may have stemmed from a concern that the de-
mographics of the sample used to derive norma-
tive data for particular tests were too dissimilar
from the population from which their patients
are drawn; for example, the normative sample
may consist predominantly of urban dwellers yet
their patients come from isolated rural locations.
Although the collection of local norms is to be
actively encouraged, the time and expense in-
volved is such that the sample sizes are often
modest.
Third, in recent years there has been an enor-
mous resurgence of interest within academic
neuropsychology in single case studies (Ellis &
Young, 1996; McCarthy & Warrington, 1990;
Shallice, 1988). In many of these studies the
theoretical questions posed cannot be addressed
using existing instruments and therefore novel
instruments are designed specifically for the
study. The sample size of the control or norma-
tive group recruited for comparison purposes in
such studies is typically less than 10 and often
less than 5. It may be noted that the control
group in such studies need not be healthy partic-
ipants; for example, the hypothesis tested may
be that a particular individual case differs in one
important respect from a sample of patients hav-
ing other clinical features in common.
When population parameters are known, or
when we have normative samples of sufficient
size to make highly reliable estimates of these
parameters, probabilities for normally distrib-
uted scores are easily estimated by using z:
One problem with using the standard deviation
of a small normative sample as if it were the
parameter (F) is that, although the sample vari-
ance is a maximum likelihood estimator of F2,
the sampling distribution of the variance is posi-
tively skewed. This means that we will be more
likely to underestimate F than to overestimate it.
Thus we are more likely to overestimate z and
the rarity of the observation.
When we are not in a position to assume a
highly stable estimate of the necessary parame-
ters, one solution is to use the standard deviation
of the (small) normative sample as an estimate
of the population standard deviation, but to cal-
culate probabilities sing the t distribution in
place of z. The formula would otherwise be the
same, but the distribution would have wider
tails.
Sokal and Rohlf (1995), writing for biometri-
cians, describe amodification to th independ nt
samples t test which can be used to compare a
single specimen with a sample. In this modifica-
tion the individual specimen (or person) is
treated as a sample of N =1 and therefore does
not co tribute to the estimat of thewithin-group
variance. Sokal and Rohlf’s (1995) formula,
with minor changes in notation, is as follows:
,
where, for our purposes, X1= the individual’s
score, = the mean of the normative sample,
S2 = the standard deviation of the normative
sample, and N2 = the sample size. To avoid any
uncertainty the standard deviation referred to
here is the estimated population standard devia-
tion, that is, it should be calculated with N-1 in
the denominator not N. With large samples the
two SDs will be very similar but this is not the
case with small Ns. When working with sum-
mary data (i.e., the output of a statistical pack-
age or published data) it can be assumed that the
SD reported will be the estimated population
SD.The degrees of freedom for t are N2 + N1 – 2
which reduces to N2 – 1.
To illustrate the application of this procedure
in neuropsychological assessment, take the ex-
ample of a patient who obtains a score of 33 on
a test of spatial memory. The normative sample
for someone of her / his age has an N of 15 and
a mean and standard deviation of 50 and 10 re-
spectively. Entering this data into the formula
yields the following:
= = =
= 1.647
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7.22.  In contrast, analysis of LB’s ability to discriminate “old” and “new” faces 
compared to the controls’ accuracy to discriminate “old” and “new” faces 
revealed that LB was significantly less accurate than controls in discriminating 
“old” and “new” faces, t(15)=3.60, p<.05.  
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Figure 6. Accuracy data from Experiment 1 (standard error bars are displayed for the 
controls). 
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 Analysis of the age-matched control’s accuracy to discriminate “old” and 
“new” eyeglasses compared to the controls’ accuracy to discriminate “old” and 
“new” eyeglasses revealed no significant difference, t(15)= .36, p>.05. The 
standard error for eyeglass comparisons of accuracy was 6.91.  Similarly, 
analysis of LB’s accuracy to discriminate “old” and “new” eyeglasses compared 
to the controls’ accuracy to discriminate “old” and “new” eyeglasses revealed no 
significant difference, t(15)=.072, p>.05.  LB’s difference in accuracy between 
discriminating “old” and “new” faces and “old” and “new” eyeglasses, relative to 
controls, revealed a significant interaction, t(15)=3.59, p<.05 
Reaction Time Data 
The mean reaction time to the correct trials for faces for the controls, the 
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Figure 7.  Results from Farah, Levinson, and Klein’s (1995) eyeglass experiment. 
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age-matched control, and LB were 1920 msec (s=388.26), 2106 msec, and 6321 
msec respectively. The standard error for face comparisons of reaction time was 
400.21.  The age-matched control’s reaction time for faces did not significantly 
differ from the controls’ reaction time for faces, t(15)=.46, p>.05.  In contrast, LB’s 
reaction time for faces significantly differed from the controls’ reaction time for 
faces, t(15)=10.98, p<.05.   
 The mean reaction time to eyeglasses for the controls, the age-matched 
control, and LB were 2082 msec (s=581.79), 2041 msec, and 5675 msec 
respectively. The standard error for eyeglass comparisons of reaction time was 
600.87.  The age-matched control’s reaction time for faces did not significantly 
differ from the controls’ reaction time for faces, t(15)= -.07, p>.05.  In contrast, 
LB’s reaction time for eyeglasses significantly differed from the controls’ reaction 
time for eyeglasses, t(15)=5.98, p<.05.  LB’s difference in reaction time between 
face and eyeglass stimuli differed reliably from the difference in the controls’ 
mean reaction time between face and eyeglass stimuli, indicating a significant 
interaction t(15)=2.57, p<.05.  Importantly, the reaction time data indicate no 
speed-accuracy trade-off in accuracy for both controls and LB. 
d’ Data 
 LB’s sensitivity (d’) and response bias (c) while discriminating faces and 
eyeglasses were calculated and compared to the controls’ mean d’ and c (see 
Table 1) to investigate whether LB’s sensitivity and responses bias differed from 
that of the controls.  All analyses comparing the age-matched control’s sensitivity 
and response bias to the controls’ mean sensitivity and response bias were not 
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significant.  A significant interaction was found when comparing LB’s sensitivity to 
the controls’ sensitivity to accurately discriminate “old” and “new” trials across 
stimulus types, t(15)= 2.96, p<.05.  Consistent with the accuracy data, LB’s d’ 
was significantly worse than the controls’ mean d’ when discriminating “old” and 
“new” faces, t(15)= -2.96, p<.05, but did not significantly differ from the controls’ 
mean d’ when discriminating “old” and “new” eyeglasses, t(15)= -.25, p>.05. The 
standard error for d’ comparisons of faces was .60 and the standard error for d’ 
comparisons of eyeglasses was .36.  All comparisons of LB’s response bias to 
that of controls were not significant. 
Table 1. 
Sensitivity Means (d’) and Response Bias Means (c) for LB and Controls from 
Experiment 1 
 LB Age-matched Control Control 
 d’         c d’         c d’ (s)     c (s) 
Faces .38     .06 2.56       0 2.15 (.58)   .17 (.27) 
Eyeglasses .51       0 .64       .07 .6 (.35)    .17 (.37) 
Faces-Eyeglasses -.13     .06 1.92     -.07 
 
1.55 (.55)  .26 (.35) 
 
Discussion 
 The results obtained in Experiment 1, and shown in Figure 7, are similar to 
the results Farah et al. (1995) obtained in their eyeglass experiment.  Although 
LB was significantly more impaired than controls at discriminating “old” and “new” 
faces, she did not differ from controls in her ability to discriminate “old” and “new” 
eyeglasses.  Caution needs to be exercised before concluding that the results 
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obtained in this experiment support the notion that prosopagnosia is a face-
specific impairment.  First, the null results obtained for eyeglasses may be an 
artifact of a floor effect.  Specifically, LB and controls were barely above chance 
in the eyeglass condition; LB and controls may have guessed on all the eyeglass 
trials except for a few unique eyeglasses that they were able to remember 
(bringing both LB and the controls’ slightly above chance). Second, the results 
from this experiment do not necessarily contradict the coordinate relations 
hypothesis.  The coordinate relations hypothesis predicts that LB would make 
significantly more errors when she has to discriminate eyeglasses that share the 
same structural description, whereas LB will not significantly differ from controls 
in trials that require her to discriminate eyeglasses that share different structural 
descriptions. Unfortunately, the current experimental paradigm did not allow a 
determination of LB’s ability to distinguish eyeglasses when they did or did not 
share the same structural descriptions.   
 Although the results obtained in Experiment 1 are inconclusive as to 
whether or not LB suffers from a face-specific impairment, other research 
suggests that her impairments are not face-specific.  For example, Casner (2006) 
has already demonstrated that LB is impaired in non-face object discrimination 
tasks that require her to discriminate two objects that share the same structural 
description.  The classes of objects on which Casner tested LB included animals, 
subordinate-level objects, and nonsense objects.  Therefore, it is very possible 
that the results obtained in Experiment 1 are an artifact of floor effects. 
 Before one can conclude that LB does not significantly differ from controls 
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in her ability to discriminate eyeglasses, two limitations of Experiment 1 need to 
be resolved: 1.)  The eyeglass task used in this experiment needs to be easier so 
that controls are well above chance, 2.)  The experimental design needs to allow 
a determination of the type of structural description comparisons being made 
(i.e., whether the eyeglasses being compared are the same, are different but 
shared the same structural description, or are different and have different 
structural descriptions). 
Experiment 2 
 Analysis of Experiment 1 indicated that controls were slightly above 
chance in discriminating “old” and “new” eyeglasses.  Experiment 2 sought to 
decrease the difficulty of the task used in Experiment 1 by using half the number 
of faces and eyeglasses that were used in Experiment 1.  
Method 
Participants 
 The participants who were in Experiment 1 also participated in Experiment 
2. 
Apparatus  
 All materials except the visual stimuli were identical to those that were 
used in Experiment 1.  Twenty black and white photographs of male faces and 
twenty black and white photographs of eyeglasses were used as stimuli for this 
experiment. 
Procedure 
 In the study phase of the experiment, control participants were shown 
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each photograph (10 faces and 10 eyeglasses) for three seconds, with faces and 
eyeglasses randomly intermixed.  As in Experiment 1, LB viewed all study 
photographs three times each for six seconds.  Upon completion of the study 
phase, all participants completed a test phase in which they were instructed to 
make old/new judgments on a randomly assigned order of all the old and new 
photographs of faces and eyeglasses (20 faces and 20 eyeglasses).  All other 
procedures were the same as Experiment 1. 
Results 
Accuracy Data   
The accuracy data from Experiment 2 can be seen in Figure 8. The 
standard error for the face comparisons of accuracy was 6.09.  Analysis of the 
age-matched control’s accuracy to discriminate “old” and “new” faces compared 
to the controls’ accuracy to discriminate “old” and “new” faces revealed no 
significant difference, t(15)=.77, p>.05.  A modified t-test indicated that LB was 
significantly less accurate than controls in discriminating “old” and “new” faces, 
t(15)=3.33, p<.05.   
 Analysis of the age-matched control’s accuracy to discriminate “old” and 
“new” eyeglasses compared to the controls’ accuracy to discriminate “old” and 
“new” eyeglasses revealed no significant difference, t(15)=1.62, p>.05.  Similarly, 
LB’s accuracy for discriminating eyeglasses compared to the controls’ accuracy 
for discriminating eyeglasses did not significantly differ, t(15)=1.26, p>.05. The 
standard error for the eyeglass comparisons of accuracy was 8.67.  Further, LB’s 
difference in accuracy between faces and eyeglasses did not reliably differ from 
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the difference in the controls’ mean accuracy between faces and eyeglasses and 
indicated no significant interaction, t(15)=.88, p>.05.   
 
Reaction Time Data 
 The mean reaction time for correct trials to faces for the controls, the age-
matched control, and LB were 1211 msec (s=319.11), 1467 msec, and 3286 
msec respectively. The standard error for the face comparisons of reaction time 
was 328.94.  The age-matched control’s mean reaction time for faces did not 
significantly differ from the controls’ mean reaction time for faces, t(15)=.778, 
p>.05.  In contrast, LB’s mean reaction time for faces significantly differed from 
the controls’ mean reaction time for faces, t(15)=6.31, p<.05.  
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Figure 8.  Accuracy data from Experiment 2 (standard error bars are displayed for the 
controls). 
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 Mean reaction time to eyeglasses for the controls, the age-matched 
control, and LB were 1528 msec (s=501.02), 1554 msec, and 2259 msec 
respectively. The standard error for the eyeglass comparisons of reaction time 
was 516.45.  The age-matched control’s mean reaction for eyeglasses did not 
significantly differ from the controls’ mean reaction time for eyeglasses, t(15)=.05, 
p>.05.   In contrast, LB’s mean reaction time for eyeglasses significantly differed 
from the controls’ mean reaction time for eyeglasses, t(15)=5.98, p<.05.  LB’s 
difference in reaction time between face and eyeglass stimuli differed reliably 
from the difference in the controls’ mean reaction time between face and 
eyeglass stimuli, indicating a significant interaction, t(15)=2.57, p<.05.  Whereas, 
LB was slightly slower in reaction time when discriminating “old” and “new” faces, 
as compared to LB’s reaction time for eyeglasses, the inverse was true for the 
controls, t(15)=2.5, p<.05.   
d’ Data 
 As in Experiment 1, LB’s sensitivity (d’) and response bias (c) while 
discriminating faces and eyeglasses were calculated and compared to the 
controls’ mean d’ and c (see Table 2). The standard error for the d’ comparisons 
of faces was .47 and the standard error for the d’ comparisons of eyeglasses was 
.54.   All analyses comparing the age-matched control’s sensitivity and response 
bias to the controls’ mean sensitivity and response biases were not significant. 
No significant interaction was found when comparing LB and the controls’ 
sensitivity to accurately discriminate “old” and “new” trials across stimulus types, 
t(15)= -1.56, p>.05.  Consistent with the accuracy data, LB’s d’ was significantly 
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worse than the controls’ mean d’ when discriminating “old” and “new” faces, 
t(15)= -3.28, p<.05, but did not significantly differ from the controls’ mean d’ when 
discriminating “old” and “new” eyeglasses, t(15)= -.72, p>.05.   
Table 2 
Sensitivity Means (d’) and Response Bias Means (c) for LB and Controls from 
Experiment 2 
 LB Age-matched Control Control 
 d’         c d’         c d’ (s)     c (s) 
Faces 1.37     -.16 3.29      0 2.91 (.46)   .05 (.25) 
Eyeglasses .8       -1.24 2.12    .22 1.18 (.52)   .25 (.37) 
Faces-Eyeglasses .57     1.08 1.17    -.22 
 
1.73 (.46)  -.2 (.53) 
 
 A significant interaction was found when comparing LB’s response bias to 
that of the controls’ response biases when discriminating “old” and “new” trials 
across stimulus types, t(15)= 2.49, p<.05.  Specifically, LB was significantly more 
biased to indicate that a “new” eyeglass was “old” than were the controls’, t(15)=  
-3.88, p<.05.  In contrast, LB’s measure of response bias did not significantly 
differ from the controls’ response bias when making “old” and “new” judgments to 
faces, t(15)= .83, p>.05. The standard error for the response bias comparisons of 
faces was .26 and the standard error for the response bias comparisons of 
eyeglasses was .38.  LB’s measure of response bias is consistent with her post-
experiment interview in which she indicated she was merely guessing during the 
eyeglass trials; she thought that almost all of the eyeglasses that were presented 
in this experiment were “old” (only two times did she indicate that they were 
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“new). 
Discussion 
 Farah et al. (1995) found an interaction between their patient, LH, and 
controls in the ability to remember faces and eyeglasses.  Specifically, LH was 
significantly impaired in face recognition, compared to controls, but LH did not 
differ from controls in his ability to discriminate eyeglasses.  As a result, Farah et 
al. posited that prosopagnosia is a deficit in face recognition and not within-
category discrimination.  In contrast, I failed to find an interaction when 
comparing LB’s accuracy to the controls’ accuracy across stimulus conditions.  
The data for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 suggest that all subjects were at 
floor in Experiment 1, but when performance was lifted off the floor for the 
controls in Experiment 2, LB did not significantly improve in Experiment 2 
suggesting that LB also shows a deficit for recognizing eyeglasses.  Farah et al. 
may have obtained similar results had they raised their controls mean accuracy 
further from the floor. 
 LB’s accuracy and RT data could be interpreted as a speed-accuracy 
trade-off, and there is reason to believe that perhaps it is.  LB’s reaction time was 
actually faster on the eyeglass trials in which she made the most errors, as 
compared to her performance on the face trials.  Upon completion of this 
experiment, I interviewed LB and she said that the experiment was terribly 
difficult, and she felt like she was guessing in the eyeglass condition.  
Furthermore, LB indicated that she felt that she recognized “a few” of the faces.  
Therefore, it is possible that LB’s slower reaction time in the face condition 
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reflects longer retrieval for residual familiarity traces of a familiar face that was 
not present for any of the eyeglasses. 
Experiment 3 
 Experiments 1 and 2 were direct replications of the Farah et al. (1995) 
study that used an episodic memory task.  The problem with using an episodic 
memory task to test the coordinate relations hypothesis is that one cannot control 
for the structural descriptions of the eyeglasses being compared because the 
participants are comparing each stimulus in the test phase to their memory 
traces for all the stimuli in the learning phase.   Experiments 3 and 4 required 
subjects to perform a discrimination task between two eyeglasses that were 
presented sequentially.  The eyeglasses that participants discriminated in 
Experiments 3 and 4 sometimes shared the same structural descriptions and 
other times did not share the same structural description.  In Experiment 3, LB 
and controls decided whether two photographs of eyeglasses that were 
presented sequentially were physically identical or different.  Half of the pairs of 
eyeglasses being compared were physically identical, while the other half of the 
eyeglasses differed either metrically or in their structural descriptions (see Figure 
9).  Based on previous experiments with LB, in which LB discriminating various 
objects that shared or did not share the same structural description (Casner, 
2006), it is predicted that LB will be impaired, relative to controls, when 
discriminating eyeglasses that share the same structural description, but will not 
differ from controls in her ability to discriminate eyeglasses that do not share the 
same structural description. 
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Method 
Participants 
 The participants who where in the previous experiments also participated 
in Experiment 3.  
Figure 9.  Examples of the three types of trials in Experiment 3.  In the different 
structural description discrimination trial, illustrated above, the rectangular shaped 
eyeglasses were compared to the oval shaped eyeglasses.  In contrast, in the same 
structural description discrimination trial, illustrated above, both eyeglasses being 
compared are rectangular shaped.  
 
Apparatus 
 All apparatus except the visual stimuli were identical to those that were 
used in Experiment 1.  The visual stimuli in this experiment were made up of 16 
photographs of eyeglasses all taken from the same viewpoint. Half of the 
eyeglasses that were obtained were rectangular and the other were round.  All 
eyeglasses that were obtained for Experiment 3 were wire-rimmed.  
Procedure 
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Presentation of the stimuli was self-paced.  Participants pressed any key 
to begin each trial. Upon pressing any key, a fixation cue was presented for 500 
msec, followed by the presentation of one pair of eyeglasses for 1000 msec, 
followed by a pattern mask for 500 msec, followed by a second pair of 
eyeglasses that remained on the screen until the subject responded (see Figure 
10).  The second pair of eyeglasses was randomly presented at one of four 
possible locations on any trial (either 1.5° of visual angle above and 1.5° of visual 
angle to the right, 1.5° of visual angle above and 1.5° of visual angle to the left, 
1.5° of visual angle below and 1.5° of visual angle to the right, or 1.5° of visual 
angle below and 1.5° of visual angle to the left of the fixation point) and all four 
locations were presented equally often. Displacing the second set of eyeglasses 
from the first prevented participants from simply using the height or width of the 
second pair of eyeglasses as an indicator of whether or not the pairs of 
eyeglasses were identical.  In half of the trials the two eyeglasses presented 
were physically identical. For the trials in which the eyeglasses were not 
identical, on fifty percent of the trials the eyeglasses differed only metrically (i.e., 
round glasses followed by round or rectangular glasses followed by rectangular), 
while on the other 50% of the trials, the two eyeglasses had different structural 
descriptions (i.e., rectangular glasses followed by round or round glasses 
followed by rectangular).   
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Figure 10.  Examples of different trials in Experiment 3. Half of the different trials 
consisted of two sets of eyeglasses that did not share the same structural description, 
while the remaining different trials consisted of two sets of eyeglasses that shared the 
same structural description.   
 
On each trial, the participants’ task was to indicate whether the two 
eyeglasses presented were physically identical (by pressing the “z” key) or 
different (by pressing the “/” key).  Participants were provided with written 
accuracy feedback following each trial. Participants pressed any key to begin the 
subsequent trial. 
 The experiment consisted of 256 trials.  On half of the trials the two 
eyeglasses presented were physically identical (each of the 16 eyeglasses was 
be shown back-to-back in eight separate identical trials for a total of 128 identical 
trials).   In the remaining trials, each of the 16 eyeglasses were compared to four 
different eyeglasses that shared the same structural description and to four 
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different eyeglasses that had different structural descriptions. The ordering of the 
trials was determined randomly, but the order was identical for all subjects.  All 
participants completed a series of ten practice trials prior to the actual 
experiment.  None of the practice images were presented in the actual trials. 
Results 
 As in Experiments 1 and 2, a modified t-test was used for all comparisons 
of LB to the controls.  Furthermore, although sensitivity and response bias could 
technically be measured in Experiments 3 and 4, they were not calculated 
principally because I was only interested in the different trials of Experiments 3 
and 4  (i.e., the two different-trial conditions, same structural description or 
different structural description). 
Accuracy Data 
  The accuracy data from the different trials of Experiment 3 can be seen in 
Figure 11. The standard error for the identical eyeglass comparisons of accuracy 
was 4.24.  The age-matched control’s mean accuracy for the identical trials did 
not significantly differ from the controls’ mean accuracy for the identical trials, 
t(15)= -.73, p >.05.  Further, LB’s mean accuracy for the identical trials did not 
significantly differ from the controls’ mean accuracy for identical trials, t(15)= -.47, 
p >.05.   
Analysis revealed that the age-matched control’s difference in mean 
accuracy between the different structural description and same structural 
description trials was not significantly different from the controls’ difference in 
mean accuracy between the different structural description and same structural 
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description trials, t(15)= .86, p>.05. The standard error for the same structural 
description trials was 4.94 and the standard error for the different structural 
description comparisons of eyeglasses was 3.65.  Comparisons of the age-
matched control’s mean accuracy relative to controls’ in the different structural 
description discrimination trials, t(15)= .88, p>.05, and same structural 
description discrimination trials, t(15)= .29, p>.05, failed to reach significance. 
Analysis revealed that LB’s difference in mean accuracy between the different 
structural description and same structural description trials was significantly 
greater than the difference in the controls’ mean accuracy rate between the 
different structural description and same structural description trials, t(15)= 2.18, 
p<.05.  Comparisons of LB’s mean accuracy relative to controls’ in the different 
structural description discrimination trials, t(15)= -1.31, p>.05, and same 
structural description discrimination trials, t(15)= -1.25, p>.05, failed to reach 
significance. 
 
 
  
                                                                                                        
  
 
36
Figure 11.  Accuracy data from the different trials of Experiment 3 (standard error bars 
are displayed for the controls). 
 
Reaction Time Data 
  The mean reaction time for the correct identical, different structural 
description, and same structural description trials for the controls, the age-
matched control, and LB are reported in Table 3.   All comparisons of the age-
matched control’s mean reaction time to that of the student controls’ mean 
reaction time were not significantly different.  Analysis of LB’s difference in mean 
reaction time between the same structural description and different structural 
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description discrimination trials was significantly different than the difference in 
the controls’ mean reaction time between the same structural description and 
different structural description discrimination trials t(15) 2.12, p<.05.  Analysis of 
LB’s mean reaction time for the same structural description trials was not 
significantly different from the controls’ mean reaction time for the same 
structural description trials, t(15) 1.89, p>.05.  Further, LB’s mean reaction time 
for the different structural description trials was not significantly different from the 
controls’ mean reaction time for the different structural description trials, t(15) 
1.58, p>.05.  The mean reactions times for LB and the controls’ tended to be 
slower for the same structural description trials than the different structural 
description trials—suggesting that the observed pattern in the error data was not 
due to a speed-accuracy trade-off. 
Table 3 
Mean Reaction Time (msec) for Identical, Different, and Same Structural Discrimination 
Trials for LB and Controls from Experiment 3 
 LB Age-matched Control Control 
 M  M  M (SE) 
Identical 626 1677 857 (216.61) 
Different Structural 
Description  1187 580 834 (223.70) 
Same Structural 
Description 1336 631 
 
871 (246.44)  
 
Discussion 
 As the coordinate hypothesis predicts and consistent with previous studies 
examining LB’s visual deficits (Casner, 2006), LB had greater impairment on the 
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same structural description trials than the different structural description trials 
relative to controls.  Of the three experiments performed thus far, Experiment 3 is 
the only experiment that allowed me to directly control for structural descriptions 
of the eyeglasses that are being compared at the time of response. When the 
eyeglasses did not share the same structural description, consistent with Farah 
et al. (1995) and the coordinate relations hypothesis, LB’s accuracy did not differ 
from the controls.  Nonetheless, Farah et al. (1995) posited that prosopagnosics 
are not impaired in within-category discrimination tasks; however, our results 
suggest that prosopagnosics can be impaired in within-category discrimination 
tasks requiring prosopagnosics to discriminate within-category objects that share 
the same structural description.   Consequently, the coordinate relations 
hypothesis predicted the results obtained in Experiment 3, whereas the 
hypothesis of Farah et al. did not.  
Experiment 4 
In Experiment 3, because the stimuli were drawn from photographs, it is 
possible that participants were making their discriminations by using aspects of 
the stimulus other than the shapes of the lenses (e.g., differences in illumination 
or texture).  In order to control for any extraneous variables (other than lens 
shape) that may have been used to differentiate the eyeglasses in Experiment 3, 
Experiment 4 used line drawings of eyeglasses.  In this experiment the only 
variable that changed within the two types of different trials was the shape or size 
of the lenses (see Figure 12). 
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Figure 12.  Examples of the three types of trials used in Experiment 4.  In the different 
structural description discrimination trial shown above, the rectangular shaped eyeglass 
lens is compared to an oval shaped eyeglass lens.  In contrast, in the same structural 
description discrimination trial shown above, both eyeglass lenses being compared are 
rectangular shaped and differ only in their size. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 The participants who were in the previous experiments also participated in 
Experiment. 
Apparatus  
All materials except the visual stimuli were identical to those that were 
used in Experiment 3.   Figure 12 illustrates the different structural descriptions 
and metric changes that were used in this experiment. A total of 24 grayscale line 
drawings of eyeglasses were used (6 structural descriptions X 2 ear pieces X 2 
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metric variations).  
 
Procedure 
 All procedures in Experiment 4 were identical to the procedures used in 
Experiment 3 unless noted otherwise.  The experiment consisted of 192 trials.  In 
half of the trials (96) the two pairs of eyeglasses were physically identical. In the 
Figure 13.  Examples of the six different structural descriptions that were used for 
this experiment and their corresponding metric changed versions.   
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remaining trials, each of the 24 eyeglasses were compared to a different pair of 
eyeglasses that shared the same structural description but differed metrically and 
to a different pair of eyeglasses that had a different structural description (see 
Figure 14).  Upon completion of all 48 different trials, the different trials were 
repeated a second time (96 total different trials).  The ordering of the trials was 
determined randomly, but the order was identical for all subjects.  All participants 
completed a series of eight practice trials prior to the actual experiment.  None of 
the practice images were presented in the actual trials.  
 
 
 
Figure 14. Examples of different trials in Experiment 4. Half of the different trials 
consisted of two sets of eyeglasses that did not share the same structural description, 
while the remaining different trials consisted of two sets of eyeglasses that share the same 
structural description.  
  
 
Results 
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Accuracy Data 
The accuracy data from the different trials of Experiment 4 can be seen in 
Figure 15. The standard error for the identical eyeglass comparisons of accuracy 
was 5.04.  The age-matched control’s mean accuracy for the identical trials did 
not significantly differ from the controls’ mean accuracy for the identical trials, 
t(15)= -.579, p>.05.  Further, LB’s accuracy for the identical trials did not 
significantly differ from the controls’ accuracy for identical trials, t(15)=1.54, 
p>.05.  
 
Figure 15. Accuracy data from the different trials of Experiment 4 (standard error bars 
are displayed for the controls). 
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 Analysis revealed that the age-matched control’s difference in mean 
accuracy between the different structural description and same structural 
description trials was not significantly different from the controls’ difference in 
mean accuracy between the different structural description and same structural 
description trials, t(15)= -1.34, p>.05. The standard error for the same structural 
description trials was 10.44 and the standard error for the different structural 
description comparisons of eyeglasses was 5.07.  Comparisons of the age-
matched control’s mean accuracy relative to controls’ in the different structural 
description discrimination trials, t(15)= 1.52, p>.05, and same structural 
description discrimination trials, t(15)= -.97, p>.05, failed to reach significance.  
Analysis revealed that LB’s difference in mean accuracy between the different 
structural description and same structural description trials was not significantly 
different from the controls’ mean accuracy difference between the different 
structural description and same structural description trials, t(15)= .73, p>.05.  
Comparisons of LB’s mean accuracy relative to controls’ in the different structural 
description discrimination trials, t(15)= -1.11, p>.05, and same structural 
description discrimination trials, t(15)= .51, p>.05, failed to reach significance. 
Reaction Time Data 
 The mean reaction time for the correct identical, different structural 
description, and same structural description trials for the controls, the age-
matched control, and LB are reported in Table 4.   All comparisons of the age-
matched control’s mean reaction time to the student controls’ mean reaction time 
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were not significantly different.  Analysis of LB’s difference in mean reaction time 
between the same structural description and different structural description 
discrimination trials was not significantly different than the difference in the 
controls’ mean reaction time between the same structural description and 
different structural description discrimination trials, t(15) 1.21, p>.05.  Analysis of 
LB’s mean reaction time for the same structural description trials was significantly 
different from the controls’ mean reaction time for the same structural description 
trials, t(15) 2.91, p<.05.  Further, LB’s mean reaction time for the different 
structural description trials were not significantly different from the controls’ mean 
reaction time for the different structural description trials, t(15) 2.07, p>.05. 
Table 4 
Mean Reaction Time (msec) for Identical, Different, and Same Structural Discrimination 
Trials for LB and Controls from Experiment 4 
 LB Age-matched Control Control 
 M  M  M (SE) 
Identical 2903 1640 1865 (216.61) 
Different Structural 
Description  2353 1634 1914 (211.69) 
Same Structural 
Description 2466 1634 
 
1876 (202.55)  
 
Discussion 
 In contrast to Experiment 3, LB did not produce significantly more errors in 
the same structural description trials than the different structural description trials 
relative to controls.   These results are peculiar when one considers a previous 
eyeglass experiment using the same experimental paradigm and very similar line 
                                                                                                        
  
 
45
drawings of eyeglasses (see Figure 15 for previous results from Kahl, Cooper, 
O’Brien, & Scolaro, 2007).  In this experiment, Kahl et al. found a significant 
interaction, in which LB made significantly more errors for the same structural 
description trials than the different structural description trials relative to controls.  
Upon completion of Experiment 4, I interviewed LB and asked her about her 
thoughts on the experiments.  LB informed me that she developed a strategy for 
the eyeglasses in which she ignored the eyeglass as a whole and fixated only the 
lenses of the eyeglasses being compared.  Unfortunately, I did not anticipate 
such a strategy when creating the stimuli and therefore did not change any other 
part of the eyeglasses being compared other than the lens frames.  In order to 
resolve this anomaly all subsequent experiments that are performed with LB 
need to be designed in such a manner that prevents her from fixating on one part 
of an object. 
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Figure 16.  Accuracy data obtained in an earlier experiment (Kahl, Cooper, O’Brien, & 
Scolaro, 2007) using the same type of eyeglass stimuli (standard error bars are displayed 
for the controls). 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Four experiments were conducted to test a prosopagnosic, LB, relative to 
controls in her ability to discriminate eyeglass and face stimuli.   Experiment 1 
attempted to directly replicate Farah et al.’s (1995) eyeglass experiment. The 
results obtained from this experiment paralleled the results Farah et al. obtained. 
The results showed that LB’s mean accuracy was only differed from the controls’ 
mean accuracy in the face condition; she did not differ from the controls in her 
ability to discriminate “old” and “new” eyeglasses. However, the results obtained 
in Experiment 1 and Farah et al. may have been an artifact of a floor effect.  
Therefore, Experiment 2 was designed to raise the control subjects’ performance 
off the floor.   In contrast to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 failed to find a significant 
interaction between stimulus type and subject group.  Experiment 2’s results 
suggest the results of Experiment 1 and the results obtained by Farah et al. may 
be a consequence of a floor effect on the controls. 
 The experimental paradigm of Experiments 1 and 2 placed a greater 
demand on long-term memory, requiring participants to store multiple face and 
eyeglass stimuli in memory until the stimulus in memory was presented during 
the test phase of the experiment.  Consequently, I could not determine what the 
structural descriptions of the eyeglasses were that participant had in memory, 
from the learning phase, at the time of the participants’ response to test phase 
stimuli. 
Unlike Experiments 1 and 2, Experiments 3 and 4 used a different 
experimental paradigm that controlled for the structural descriptions of the 
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eyeglasses being compared.   Experiment 3 revealed that LB made significantly 
more errors in the same structural description condition than the different 
structural description condition relative to both the age-matched control and the 
student control group.  These results are consistent with previous studies 
(Casner, 2006; Kahl et al., 2007) in which LB made significantly more errors than 
controls on tasks that required her to discriminate two objects that shared the 
same structural description compared to when they did not share the same 
structural description.   
 Inconsistent with previous studies, and the coordinate relations 
hypothesis, LB’s mean accuracy did not significantly differ from the controls in 
either the same or different structural description conditions of Experiment 4.  
However, upon completion of Experiment 4, LB indicated the she began fixating 
only on the lens frames instead of the entire eyeglass when discriminating 
different eyeglasses.  As a result of this strategy, LB did not have to use a 
structural description (i.e., parts AND relations) to determine whether or not two 
eyeglasses that were presented were the same or different.  Future experiments 
with LB will need to ensure that LB does not use such a strategy. 
Support for the Coordinate Relations Hypothesis 
 A number of the present study’s findings are consistent with the 
coordinate relations hypothesis.  First, Experiment 2 demonstrated that when the 
controls’ mean accuracy from Experiment 1 was raised above the floor, LB’s 
accuracy did not change.  In other words, LB showed a deficit with remembering 
eyeglasses that was comparable to her deficit with remembering faces.  Although 
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this result does not directly support the coordinate relations hypothesis (e.g., the 
structural descriptions of the eyeglasses being compared was not controlled for), 
it does contradict Farah et al.’s results in which she found a significant 
interaction; they reported that LH made significantly more errors in the face 
condition than the eyeglass condition relative to controls.  Second, Experiment 3 
demonstrated that LB made significantly more errors discriminating eyeglasses 
with the same structural description than eyeglasses that had different structural 
descriptions relative to controls.  
Results Contrary to the Predictions Made by the Coordinate Relations 
Hypothesis 
 Although a number of the current studies’ results support the predictions 
made by the coordinate relations hypothesis, one cannot dismiss the results that 
contradicted the predictions made by the coordinate relations hypothesis.  First, 
the results obtained in Experiment 1 were virtually identical to the results of 
Farah et al. (1995) with the prosopagnosics showing a greater deficit in 
remembering face then remembering eyeglasses, and suggested that 
prosopagnosia is a face specific deficit—not a deficit in discriminating objects 
sharing the same structural description.  However, as demonstrated by the 
results reported in Experiment 2, in which the controls were raised off the floor, 
the results obtained in Experiment 1 appear to be an artifact of a floor-effect.  
Further, if one looks at the accuracy of the controls for the eyeglass condition in 
Farah et al.’s experiment (Figure 7), it is possible that their reported interaction 
was an artifact of floor effects as well.  Evidence to support this prediction is 
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provided by Levine and Calvanio (1989) who had previously tested Farah et al.’s 
patient LH, and who reported that LH could only identify objects having unique 
distinguishable features (e.g., basic-level objects that did not share same visual 
features such as a chair and a hammer). 
 Second, contrary to the predictions made by the coordinate relations 
hypothesis, LB’s mean accuracy in discriminating pairs of eyeglasses that shared 
same structural description were not different from LB’s mean accuracy in 
discriminating pairs of eyeglasses with different structural descriptions in 
Experiment 4.  Note, however, that this result contrasts with that of Experiment 3 
in which LB showed significantly more difficulty discriminating eyeglasses that 
shared the same structural description than discriminating eyeglasses that did 
not.  Furthermore, the results also contradict the earlier findings of Kahl et al. 
(2007).  Based on a post-experiment interview with LB, Experiment 4’s 
inconsistencies with Experiment 3 and the findings of Kahl et al. may be the 
result of the strategy that LB began using in the latter experiment, in which she 
fixated on only the lenses’ of the eyeglasses being compared and ignored all 
other parts.  
 LB’s ability to discriminate lenses of similar shapes in Experiment 4 
appears to contradict the coordinate relations hypothesis; however, given the 
strategy LB reported adopting, there are a few possible explanations for her 
performance that would not contradict the coordinate relations hypothesis.  First, 
based on the results of Experiments 1 and 2, LB’s face recognition system is not 
completely damaged.  Therefore, she could be using the vestiges of her face 
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recognition system to perform the eyeglass discrimination tasks.  Second, it is 
possible that LB only detected a change in the size of the visual field that the lens 
occupied and that she did not process the eyeglass or lens as an object.   
Unfortunately, none of the current experiments allow us to test these hypotheses, 
but in any case, the results reported in Experiment 4 do not necessarily 
contradict the coordinate relations hypothesis.  
Future Directions   
 Overall, the results from the current study, suggest that the deficits found 
in prosopagnosics are not face-specific.  Converging evidence (suggesting that 
prosopagnosia is not a face-specific disorder) is provided by Gauthier, 
Behrmann, and Tarr (1999) who tested two prosopagnosics’ (SM and CR) ability 
to discriminate faces and non-face objects that were compared at different levels 
of categorization (i.e., subordinate-level and basic-level categorization). Gauthier 
et al. found that both prosopagnosics were impaired in discriminating objects that 
were visually similar—regardless of category.  The current study tested Farah et 
al.’s (1995) hypothesis that prosopagnosia is a face-specific deficit and a number 
of the results reported here suggest that prosopagnosia is not a face-specific 
deficit, rather it is an impairment in discriminating objects that share the same 
structural description.  
 Subsequent studies examining the types impairments associated with 
prosopagnosia can benefit by considering the structural descriptions of the 
stimuli that are being used.  One implication of the current set of experiments is 
that therapy for prosopagnosics might benefit from encouraging the 
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prosopagnosic to use visual features that would be discriminable by the structural 
description recognition system. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                        
  
 
53
REFERENCES 
Aguirre, G. K., & D’Esposito, M.  (1999).  Topographic disorientation: a synthesis 
and taxonomy.  Brain, 122, 1613-1628. 
Biederman, I. (1987). Recognition-by-components: a theory of human image 
understanding. Psychological Review, 94, 115-147. 
Biederman, I., & Cooper, E. (1991). Priming contour-deleted images: evidence 
for intermediate representations in visual object recognition. Cognitive 
Psychology, 23, 393-419. 
Bornstein, B., Stroka, H., & Munitz, H. (1969). Prosopagnosia with animal face 
agnosia. Cortex, 5, 165-169. 
Brand, T., Steinke, W., Thie, A., Pessin, M. S., & Caplan. L. R. (2000). Posterior 
cerebral artery territory infarcts:  Clinical features, infarct topography, 
causes and outcome.  Multicenter results and a review of the literature. 
Cerebrovascular Diseases, 10, 172-182. 
Brooks, B. E., & Cooper, E. E. (2004). Qualitative differences in the 
representation of spatial relations for different object classes. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 30, 243-
256. 
Bülthoff, H., & Edelman, S. (1992). Psychophysical support for a two-dimensional 
view interpolation theory of object recognition. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 89, 60-64. 
 
 
                                                                                                        
  
 
54
Burgund, E. D., & Marsolek, C. J. (1997). Letter-case-specific priming in the right 
cerebral hemisphere with a form-specific perceptual identification task. 
Brain and Cognition, 35, 239-258. 
Burgund, E. D., & Marsolek, C. J. (2000). Viewpoint-invariant and viewpoint-
dependent object recognition in dissociable neural subsystems. 
Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 7, 480-489. 
Cappa, S. F., Frugoni, M., Pasquali, P., Perani, D., & Zorat, F. (1998). Category-
specific naming impairment for artifacts: A new case. Neurocase, 4, 391-
397. 
Caramazza, A., & Shelton, J. R. (1998). Domain-specific knowledge systems in 
the brain the animate-inanimate distinction. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 10, 1-34. 
Casner, G. E. (2006). A Test of the coordinate relations hypothesis:  Is  
   prosopagnosia a consequence of damage to the coordinate recognition  
   system?  Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Iowa State University, Ames, 
IA. 
Chao, L. L., Martin, A., & Haxby, J. V. (1999). Are face-responsive regions 
selective only for faces? Neuroreport: For Rapid Communication of 
Neuroscience Research, 10, 2945-2950. 
Cooper, E. E., & Wojan, T. J. (2000). Differences in the coding of spatial relations 
in face identification and basic-level object recognition. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 26, 470-
488. 
                                                                                                        
  
 
55
 
Crawford, J. R., & Howell, D. C. (1998). Comparing an an individual's test score 
against norms derived from small samples. The Clinical 
Neuropsychologist, 12, 482-486. 
Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., & Van Hoesen, G. W. (1982). Prosopagnosia: 
anatomic basis and behavioral mechanisms. Neurology, 32, 331-341. 
De Renzi, E. (1986). Current issues in prosopagnosia. In M. A. J. H. D. Ellis, F. 
Newcombe, & A. W. Young (Ed.), Aspects of face processing. Dordrecht, 
The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. 
De Renzi, E., Perani, D., Carlesimo, G. A., & Silveri, M. C. (1994). 
Prosopagnosia can be associated with damage confined to the right 
hemisphere: An MRI and PET study and a review of the literature. 
Neuropsychologia, 32, 893-902. 
Diamond, R., & Carey, S. (1986). Why faces are and are not special: An effect of 
expertise. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 115, 107-117. 
Ellis, H. D. (1983). The role of the right hemisphere in face perception. In A. W. 
Young (Ed.), Functions of the Right Cerebral Hemisphere (pp. 33-64). 
New York: Academic Press. 
Farah, M. J., Levinson, K. L., & Klein, K. L. (1995). Face perception and within-
category discrimination in prosopagnosia. Neuropsychologia, 33, 661-674. 
Farah, M. (2004). Visual Agnosia (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
                                                                                                        
  
 
56
Galper, R. E. (1970).  Recognition of faces in photographic negatives.  
Psychonomic Science, 19, 207-208. 
Galper, R. E., & Hochberg, J. (1971).  Recognition memory for photographs of 
faces.  American Journal of Psychology, 84, 351-354. 
 Gauthier, I., Anderson, A. W., Tarr, M. J., Skudlarski, P., & Gore, J. C. (1997). 
Levels of categorization in visual recognition studied using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging. Current Biology, 7, 645-651. 
Gauthier, I., Behrmann, M., & Tarr, M. J. (1999). Can face recognition really be 
dissociated from object recognition? Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
11, 349-370. 
Gauthier, I., Skudlarski, P., Gore, J. C., & Anderson, A. W. (2000). Expertise for 
cars and birds recruits brain areas involved in face recognition. Nature 
Neuroscience, 3, 191-197. 
Gauthier, I., & Tarr, M. J. (1997). Becoming a "Greeble" expert: exploring 
mechanisms for face recognition. Vision Research, 37, 1673-1682. 
Gauthier, I., Tarr, M. J., Anderson, A. W., Skudlarski, P., & Gore, J. C. (1999). 
Activation of the middle fusiform 'face area' increases with expertise in 
recognizing novel objects. Nature Neuroscience, 2, 568-573. 
Hillger, L. A., & Koenig, O. (1991). Separable mechanisms in face processing: 
Evidence from hemispheric specialization. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 3, 42-58. 
 
 
                                                                                                        
  
 
57
Humphreys, G. W., & Rumiati, R. I. (1998). Agnosia without prosopagnosia or 
alexia: Evidence for stored visual memories specific to objects.  Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 15, 243-277. 
Kahl, J., Cooper, E. E., O’Brien, A. M., & Scolaro, A. J. (November, 2007).  Can 
prosopagnosics discriminate similar, non-face objects?  Poster presented 
at the annual meeting of Object Perception, Attention, and Memory 
(OPAM), Long Beach, CA. 
Kanwisher, N., McDermott, J., & Chun, M. M. (1997). The fusiform face area: A 
module in human extrastriate cortex specialized for face perception. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 17, 4302-4311. 
Kanwisher, N., Yovel, G. (2006). The fusiform face area: A cortical region 
specialized for the perception of faces.  Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society of London B., 361, 2109-2128. 
 Kumral, E., Bayulkem, G., Ataç, C., & Alper, Y.  (2004).  Spectrum of superficial 
posterior cerebral artery territory infarcts: clinical and outcome correlates.  
European Journal of Neurology, 11, 237-246. 
Laeng, B., & Peters, M. (1995). Cerebral lateralization for the processing of 
spatial coordinates and categories in left and right-handers. 
Neuropsychologia, 33, 421-439. 
Levine, D. N., Calvanio, R. (1989). Prosopagnosia: A defect in visual configural 
processing. Brain and Cognition, 10, 149-170. 
Levine, S. C., & Banich, M. T. (1982). Lateral asymmetries in the naming of 
words and corresponding line drawings. Brain and Language, 17, 34-45. 
                                                                                                        
  
 
58
Marsolek, C. J. (1999). Dissociable neural subsystems underlie abstract and 
specific object recognition. Psychological Science, 10, 111-118. 
Mattson, A. J., Levin, H. S., & Grafham, J.  (2000).  A case of prosopagnosia 
following moderate closed head injury with left hemisphere focal lesion.  
Cortex, 36, 125-137.   
Maurer, D., & Barrera, M., (1981).  Infants’ perception of natural and distorted 
arrangements of a schematic face.   Child Development, 52, 196-202. 
Mayer, E., & Rossion, B. (2007). Prosopagnosia. In O. G. a. J. Bogousslavsky 
(Ed.), The Behavioral and Cognitive Neurology of Stroke (pp. 315-334). 
Cambridge: University Press. 
McCarthy, G., Puce, A., Gore, J. C., & Allison, T. (1997). Face-specific 
processing in the human fusiform gyrus. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 9, 605-610. 
McNeil, J. E., & Warrington, E. K. (1993). Prosopagnosia: A face specific 
disorder.  The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 46, 1-10. 
Moscovitch, M., Winocur, G., & Behrmann, M. (1997). What is special about face 
recognition? Nineteen experiments on a person with visual object agnosia 
and dyslexia but normal face recognition Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 9, 555-604. 
Perani, D., Schnur, T., Tettamanti, M., Gorno Tempini, M., Cappa, S. F., & Fazio, 
F. (1999). Word and picture matching: A PET study of semantic category 
effects. Neuropsychologia, 37, 293-306. 
 
                                                                                                        
  
 
59
Rosch, E., & Mervis, C. B. (1981). Categorization of natural objects. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 32, 89-115. 
Siebert, M., & Waxman, A. M. (1992). Learning and recognizing 3D objects from 
multiple views in a neural system. In H. Wechsler (Ed.), Neural networks 
for perception: human and machine perception (Vol. 1). San Diego, CA: 
Academic Press. 
Tarr, M. J., & Gauthier, I. (2000). FFA: A flexible fusiform area for subordinate-
level visual processing automatized by expertise. Nature Neuroscience, 3, 
764-769. 
Tsao, D. Y., Freiwald, W. A., Tootell, R. B. H., & Livingstone, M. S. (2006). A 
cortical region consisting entirely of face-selective cells.  Science, 311, 
670-674. 
Ullman, S. (1989). Aligning pictorial descriptions: an approach to object 
recognition. Cognition, 32, 193-254. 
Ullman, S., & Basri, R. (1991). Recognition by linear combinations of models. 
IEEE Transactions of Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 13, 992-
1006. 
Wada, Y., & Yamamoto, T.  (2001).  Selective impairment of facial recognition 
due to a haematoma to the right fusiform and lateral occipital region.  
Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 40, 395-403. 
Valentine, T. (1988). Upside-down faces: A review of the effect of inversion upon 
face recognition. British Journal of Psychology, 79, 471-491. 
 
                                                                                                        
  
 
60
Yin, R. K. (1969). Looking at upside-down faces. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 81, 141-145. 
Yin, R. K. (1970). Face recognition by brain-injured patients: a dissociable ability. 
 Neuropsychologia, 8, 395-402. 
Young, A. W., Bion, P. J., & Ellis, A. W. (1980). Studies toward a model of 
laterality effects for picture and word naming. Brain and Language, 11, 54-
65. 
Zeki, S. M.  (1991).  A century of cerebral achromatopsia.  Brain, 113, 1721-
1777. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                        
  
 
61
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 I would like to first thank my parents, Linda and Dennis Kahl, for always 
supporting my academic endeavors and epitomizing the meaning of 
perseverance.  Secondly, I would like to thank my grandparents, Donna and 
Richard Hartshorne, and grandparents, William and Ellen Taylor, for all their 
support and guidance throughout the years.  
 Furthermore, I would like to thank Dr. Cooper for being an exemplary 
advisor and friend.  I am happy to know that I will have your guidance for at least 
a few more years.  Similarly, I would like to thank Alex O’Brien for being a great 
friend and fellow graduate student.  Also, I would like to thank Ashley Scolaro for 
being a great lab mate and research colleague.  Your collaboration for this 
experiment was very helpful. 
  Finally, I would like to thank Veronica Dark and William Robinson for 
serving on my POS committee and always being available for any inquiries I may 
have had. 
